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Mark Dincecco Gabriel Katz
We present new evidence about the long-run relationship between state capacity – the
fiscal and administrative power of states – and economic performance. Our database is novel
and spans 11 European countries and 4 centuries from the Old Regime to World War I. We
argue that national governments undertook two political transformations over this period:
fiscal centralisation and limited government. We find a significant direct relationship between
fiscal centralisation and economic growth. Furthermore, we find that an increase in the state’s
capacity to extract greater tax revenues was one mechanism through which both political
transformations improved economic performance. Our analysis shows systematic evidence that
state capacity is an important determinant of long-run economic growth.
Standard economic theory assumes that states are effective. Namely, states have
enough administrative infrastructure to provide secure property rights, basic market
regulations, and dispute resolution through courts. Yet effective states are only a
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recent historical development and represent just a fraction of modern nations.1 Today’s
developing nations, like their historical predecessors, often confront problems of small
administrative infrastructure. Effective states cannot be taken for granted.
While there is a large econometric literature on the economic effects of democracy,
the corresponding literature on state capacity is small.2 This paper tests the long-
run relationship between state capacity and economic performance in Europe, the
birthplace of modern economic growth. To the best of our knowledge, it is among the
first papers to systematically test this relationship.3
Medieval European nation-states can be thought of as “mosaic states” (Strayer,
1970, p.53) that were not only built upon a patchwork of well-rooted local institutions,
but competed with them for fiscal dominance. This lack of extractive capacity made
it impossible for national governments to provide the administrative infrastructure
necessary to facilitate economic activity. We argue that two political transformations
resolved the long-standing state capacity problems faced by emergent nation-states in
this context. The first political transformation was the implementation of uniform tax
systems at the national level, or “fiscal centralisation”. This transformation typically
took place from 1789 onward. The second political transformation was the establish-
ment of national parliaments with the ability to monitor state expenditures at regular
intervals, or “limited government”. This transformation typically took place decades
after fiscal centralisation over the 1800s. We argue that both fiscal centralisation and
1 For historical state formation, see Hintze (1906), Mathias and O’Brien (1976), Levi (1988), Brewer
(1989), Tilly (1990), Hoffman and Rosenthal (1997), Epstein (2000), O’Brien (2011), Dincecco (2009, 2011),
Karaman and Pamuk (2010), Rosenthal and Wong (2011), and Gennaioli and Voth (2012). For state capacity
problems in sub-Saharan Africa, see Migdal (1988), Herbst (2000), Bates (2001), and Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012). By contrast, states have played important development roles in Asian Tiger nations. See Wade
(1990), Kang (2002), and Rodrik (2005).
2 Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) provides an overview of the democracy and growth literature;
also see Acemoglu et al. (2014). A recent literature expands standard economic theory to incorporate state
capacity. See Acemoglu et al. (2004), Acemoglu (2005), Besley and Persson (2009, 2011, 2013), and Acemoglu
et al. (2011).
3 Bockstette et al. (2002) finds a significant positive link between state antiquity and current economic
development. Besley and Persson (2009, 2011) show significant positive correlations between past wars and
current fiscal and economic outcomes. Dincecco and Prado (2012) find a significant positive relationship
between current fiscal capacity and economic performance. They use historical war casualties to instrument
for current fiscal institutions. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013) show a significant positive impact of
pre-colonial political centralisation on current economic development in Africa.
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limited government increased the national government’s capacity to extract greater tax
revenues: a country like France, for example, could extract nine times more revenues
per capita after the two political transformations than before them. Furthermore, we
argue that greater state capacity had positive economic implications through several
potential channels, including the creation of administrative infrastructure. Section 1
describes our hypotheses at length.
We evaluate our argument in two steps. We first test the direct relationship be-
tween political transformations and economic performance. Our econometric analysis
uses a novel annual database that spans eleven European countries from the height
of the Old Regime in 1650 to the eve of World War I in 1913. We model economic
growth as a function of political transformations, country fixed effects that account
for time-invariant country characteristics, year fixed effects that account for common
time shocks, time-varying controls, and country-specific time trends that account for
unobserved time-varying country-level heterogeneity.
The results show a significant direct role for fiscal centralisation in long-run eco-
nomic performance. We find that fiscally centralised regimes saw an average annual
growth rate in real per capita GDP that was 0.17% to 0.43% higher than fiscally
fragmented regimes. To put these magnitudes into perspective, the average annual per
capita GDP growth rate among sample countries over the 1650-1913 period was 0.62%.
Our estimates thus suggest that the growth improvements associated with fiscal cen-
tralisation were equivalent to 27% to 69% of the average per capita GDP growth rate
over this period, and 8% to 20% of its standard deviation. For another perspective,
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) find that post-1960 democratic transitions were
associated with a 1% increase in annual real per capita GDP growth during a period
for which the world average annual growth rate was roughly 1.8% (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004, p.4). This comparison suggests that fiscal centralisation was of roughly
the same economic importance historically as some scholars argue that democratisation
is today. Furthermore, we show evidence that the relationship between fiscal centrali-
sation and economic growth was not just transitory but long-lasting: the long-run per
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capita GDP growth rate for fiscally centralised regimes was 0.16 to 0.33 percentage
points higher than for fiscally fragmented regimes. While we do not find evidence for a
significant direct relationship between limited government and economic performance,
the results suggest large interaction effects between the two political transformations.
There are several potential mechanisms through which political transformations
could have improved economic performance. The second part of our econometric anal-
ysis tests one specific mechanism, greater state capacity, using the same methodology
as before to isolate the within-country correlation between political transformations
and fiscal outcomes. The results show that fiscally centralised and, to some extent,
limited government regimes extracted per capita revenues at significantly higher rates
than fiscally fragmented or absolutist regimes, respectively. Furthermore, there is some
evidence for a significant relationship between limited government and improvements
in the state’s capacity to productively spend government funds. Finally, we find sig-
nificant links between extractive capacity and subsequent economic performance. Our
estimates suggest, for example, that extractive capacity improvements account for
42% to 58% of the difference in average annual per capita GDP growth rates between
eighteenth-century England and France.
To conclude our analysis, we perform placebo tests that recode political transforma-
tions as if they had taken place decades prior to the actual years. The results provide
additional evidence that reverse causation did not drive the relationships between po-
litical transformations and the economic and fiscal outcomes that we find. We discuss
potential threats to inference and how we address them at length in Section 3.
Overall, the econometric analysis supports our argument that political transfor-
mations improved economic performance. The direct relationship between fiscal cen-
tralisation and economic growth is significant, large, and robust. Furthermore, we
find evidence that greater state capacity was one mechanism through which both fis-
cal centralisation and, to some extent, limited government played significant economic
roles. Our results also highlight the role of non-fiscal mechanisms through which fiscal
centralisation worked.
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Our paper relates to the literature that tests the long-run relationships between
historical institutional factors and economic performance, including Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997), La Porta et al. (1998), Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al. (2001,
2002, 2005), and Banerjee and Iyer (2005). However, this literature typically highlights
the role of state predation rather than state capacity. Furthermore, it does not often
test specific mechanisms through which institutional factors persist (see Nunn, 2009;
Dell, 2010, is a recent exception).
Our paper also relates to the literature that views the state as an active participant
in the development of modern capitalist systems, including Gerschenkron (1966), Mag-
nusson (2009), and O’Brien (2011). We provide an econometric counterpart to these
works. Our paper thus contributes to the debate about the institutional origins of the
Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 2008).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the historical back-
ground and develops the fiscal and economic implications. Section 2 describes the
data. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology. Section 4 reports the estima-
tion results for the direct relationship between political transformations and economic
performance. Section 5 reports the estimation results for the state capacity mechanism.
Section 6 performs the placebo tests. Section 7 concludes.
1. Historical Overview
This section characterizes two political transformations that we argue resolved key state
capacity problems in European history. Our historical account follows Dincecco (2009,
2011), which also provide sources. We first describe the political transformations, and
then discuss potential mechanisms through which greater state capacity could improve
economic performance.
5
1.1. Political Transformations
1.1.1. Fiscal centralisation
Most European states were fiscally fragmented before the nineteenth century. Con-
trary to conventional wisdom, early modern monarchs faced a host of incumbent local
institutions that reduced their extractive powers. Epstein writes that
decades of research on pre-modern political practices. . . has shown how “ab-
solutism” was a largely propagandistic device devoid of much practical sub-
stance. . . The strength of a monarch’s theoretical claims to absolute rule was
frequently inversely proportional to his de facto powers.
(Epstein, 2000, pp.13-14)
One general feature of fragmented states was the close relationship between local tax
control and political autonomy. Local elites had strong incentives to oppose national-
level fiscal reforms that threatened their traditional tax rights. The result was a classic
public goods problem. Since each local authority attempted to free-ride on the tax
contributions of other locales, the tax revenues that national governments could extract
per capita were low.
To resolve the problem of local tax free-riding and establish greater extractive
capacity, national governments had to gain the fiscal authority to impose standard tax
menus, rather than bargain place by place over individual tax rates. So long as states
equalized tax rates across locales at relatively high levels, extractive capacity rose.
1.1.2. Limited government
Although absolutist monarchs in early modern Europe spent government funds as they
wished, elites in national parliaments exercised tax authority. Hoffman and Rosenthal
(1997) argue that the main goal of absolutist monarchs was to fight wars, both for
personal glory and for homeland defence. A key reason was the problem of royal moral
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hazard in warfare (Cox, 2011). In Hoffman’s words, absolutist monarchs
likely provided far more defense than their average subject would have
wanted. They went on the offensive too, and not just to protect their king-
doms. The reasons were not hard to understand. Victory was. . . a source of
glory or a way to enhance their reputation.. . . they faced no major downside
risk to their thrones, at least in the larger states, for loss in battle. . .
(Hoffman, 2012, p.604)
Since parliamentary elites feared that absolutist monarchs would spend additional
revenues in wasteful ways like foreign military adventures, they demanded the power of
budgetary oversight before raising new taxes. To evade parliament, absolutist monarchs
resorted to fiscal predation, which reinforced the fear that they could not be trusted.
Parliamentary elites thus resisted tax requests and government revenues per capita
were low.
Regular control over state budgets established the fiscal supremacy of parliament.
The surrender of budgetary control was a credible way to resolve the royal moral hazard
problem in warfare. In turn, extractive capacity rose.4
1.2. Economic Implications
Our historical account suggests that both fiscal centralisation and limited government
increased extractive capacity. We now discuss potential channels through which greater
state capacity could have improved economic performance.
Besley and Persson (2013) argue that the state’s extractive capacity is central to
economic development.5 They show strong correlations between fiscal capacity in-
vestments in administrative infrastructure, high tax levels, and economic prosperity.
4 We base this argument on North and Weingast (1989). Scholars argue that factors beyond de jure
parliamentary change, including political coalitions (Stasavage, 2003), de facto institutional reforms (Pincus
and Robinson, 2010), and ministerial responsibility (Cox, 2011), were important to subsequent fiscal and
economic outcomes in European history.
5 Their argument follows a long tradition that includes Schumpeter (1918) and Kaldor (1963).
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Following this lead, we focus on the creation of administrative infrastructure or “in-
frastructural power” (Mann, 1986) as a potential channel linking greater state capacity
with improved economic performance. States can facilitate economic activity in sev-
eral ways, including the provision of secure property rights, basic market regulations,
and dispute resolution through courts. To erect the administrative infrastructure that
facilitates this activity, states require sufficient revenues.6 For example, Brewer (1989)
relates England’s historical military and economic rise to the establishment of lim-
ited government and greater extractive capacity following the Glorious Revolution of
1688 and the subsequent growth in administrative infrastructure. By contrast, Herbst
(2000) links low revenues in Africa with weak administrative infrastructures and the
lack of basic public services (e.g., security, courts) that facilitate economic activity.
While we emphasize the state’s extractive role, a potential complementary chan-
nel is the state’s capacity to play a productive economic role through the provision of
growth-enhancing public services like education or physical infrastructure (Besley and
Persson, 2013). By resolving the problem of royal moral hazard in warfare as described
in the previous subsection, the establishment of limited government could have led to
greater productive capacity. There is also reason to think that the centralised pro-
vision of particular public services was more growth-enhancing than the decentralised
provision of similar services. For example, historical central government investments in
mass primary education promoted common national languages and cultural identities
(Lindert, 2004; Aghion et al., 2012), which could have facilitated trade and innovation.
Political transformations could have also improved economic performance through
non-fiscal mechanisms. Institutional fragmentation in early modern Europe imposed
costs, delays, and risks that atomized domestic economies and reduced economic growth
(Epstein, 2000). Although taxes were low overall, fiscal fragmentation led to high tax
rates in sectors under royal control (Hoffman and Rosenthal, 1997). To prevent re-
6 Prescott (e.g., 2004) argues that higher taxation accounts for the worker productivity shortfall in
Europe relative to the United States. Our analysis does not find any evidence of a negative relationship
between greater state capacity and economic performance. Still, there may be reason to think that different
tax compositions (e.g., income vs. consumption-type taxes) may affect economic performance when state
capacity is already high (i.e., at OECD-country levels).
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source diversion into tax-exempt sectors, absolutist monarchs enacted rigid laws. By
resolving this problem, fiscal centralisation increased investment mobility. Similarly,
there are several potential mechanisms linking limited government with improved eco-
nomic performance (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). For example, representative
rule can facilitate sound economic policy through efficient information gathering and
transmission (Sen, 1999). Our empirical analysis accounts for the economic role of
non-fiscal mechanisms.
In summary, we argue that political transformations improved economic perfor-
mance through greater state capacity. The rest of the paper tests this argument. We
first examine the direct relationship between political transformations and economic
performance. We then examine the role of state capacity, by testing the links from
political transformations to state capacity, and from state capacity to economic per-
formance.
2. Data
2.1. Political Transformations
We define and code political transformations according to Dincecco (2009, 2011). The
process of fiscal centralisation was completed the year that the national government
first secured its revenues through a standard tax system with uniform rates throughout
the country. Limited government was established the year that parliament gained the
stable constitutional right to control the national budget on an annual basis. To ensure
stability, parliament’s power of the purse had to hold for at least two consecutive
decades.7
7 There is a close correspondence between this coding scheme and the schemes of De Long and Shleifer
(1993), Acemoglu et al. (2005), and the Polity IV database of Jaggers and Marshall (2008). De Long and
Shleifer (1993) use three measures: a binary indicator of absolutist versus non-absolutist regimes, an eight-
point constitutional scale, and the categories of capital versus coercion from Tilly (1990). However, they
code political regimes at 150-year intervals. Acemoglu et al. (2005) use two measures: categories of executive
constraints and protection for capital, both from Jaggers and Marshall (2008). However, they code political
regimes at 50- or 100-year intervals. While Jaggers and Marshall (2008) code executive constraints at yearly
intervals, their data do not start until the 1800s.
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Table 1 displays the dates for fiscal centralisation across sample countries. The
Norman Conquest of 1066 undercut provincial authority in England and established
a precocious uniformity of laws and customs.8 Structural fiscal change took place
swiftly and permanently in several parts of continental Europe after the fall of the
Old Regime. The National Assembly transformed the French tax system during the
Revolution (1789-99), a process completed by Napoleon upon taking power in 1799.
The First French Republic conquered the Low Countries in 1795, and the Southern
Netherlands including Belgium became French departments. The Batavian Republic,
the successor to the Dutch Republic, established a national tax system under French
rule in 1806. French conquest at the start of the 1800s was also the major catalyst
for fiscal change on the Italian peninsula; France annexed Piedmont in 1802. Prussia
undertook fiscal centralisation after a battle loss to France in 1806. Napoleon defeated
Austria in 1805 and invaded Portugal in 1807 and Spain in 1808, but only implemented
incomplete administrative reforms. Fiscal centralisation did not take place in Austria
and Spain until the 1840s and in Portugal until the 1850s.9 Traditional fiscal structures
remained in Scandinavia well through the 1800s. Fiscal centralisation took place in
Sweden in 1861 and in Denmark in 1903.
Table 2 displays the dates for limited government, which was typically established
decades after fiscal centralisation over the 1800s.10 Belgium was established as a consti-
tutional monarchy after declaring independence from the Netherlands in 1830. In the
Netherlands, the new constitution of 1848 called for the executive to submit annual
budgets to parliament.11 Kings Charles Albert of Piedmont and Frederick William
8 England conjoined with Wales in 1536. The Act of Union of 1707 conjoined Scotland. A similar Act
conjoined Ireland in 1800 (the Irish Free State was established in 1922). For consistency, we use the term
“England” rather than “Great Britain” or the “United Kingdom” throughout the text.
9 Austria and Hungary were the largest territories of the Austrian Empire (1804-67). The Compromise
of 1867 led to the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918). For consistency, we use the
term “Austria” throughout the text.
10 Elster (2000, ch.2) argues that the establishment of many modern constitutional governments was non-
incremental and took place in moments of crisis. Also see Russell (2004, p.106). We thank Barry Weingast
for alerting us to these works.
11 The constitution under King William I (1815-40) gave parliament the right to audit state finances, but
only at 10-year intervals (van Zanden and van Riel, 2010).
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IV of Prussia also granted liberal constitutions in 1848.12 The Compromise of 1867
marked the start of the constitutional era in Austria. Limited government was estab-
lished in France after the capture of Emperor Napoleon III during war with Prussia.13
A stable parliamentary regime was established in Spain in 1876. Limited government
and fiscal centralisation took place within a decade of each other in Portugal and
Sweden. A stable constitutional regime was established in Portugal in 1851, while the
1866 parliamentary reform in Sweden established a modern bicameral legislature.14 Fi-
nally, limited government was established well before fiscal centralisation in the Dutch
Republic (1572-1795) and in Denmark. The Dutch Republic is typically classified as
constitutional (De Long and Shleifer, 1993; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Stasavage, 2005),
while King Frederick VII of Denmark established a two-chambered parliament after
the 1848 revolutions.
One concern is the possibility of measurement error induced by the coding scheme
for political transformations. The scheme codes fiscally fragmented regimes as wholly
fragmented, even for states where fiscal divisions were small. Thus, some regimes coded
as fragmented will include data associated with greater extractive capacity, reducing
average capacity improvements after fiscal centralisation. Similarly, the scheme selects
early dates for limited government. Because extractive capacity typically increased
over time, some regimes that were coded as limited will include data associated with
lower extractive capacity, reducing average capacity improvements. The systematic
underestimation of the state capacity impacts of fiscal centralisation and limited gov-
ernment should bias the data against our hypotheses that political transformations
improved economic performance by enabling states to effectively fulfill their extractive
role.
More generally, the various ways in which early modern states tabulated annual
12 Tilly (1966) and Ziblatt (2006, pp.113-16) alike code the post-1848 regime in Prussia as constitutional,
although Tilly notes that the executive acted without legislative approval of military budgets during the
1860s.
13 The July Monarchy of King Louis Philip (1830-48) was not coded as limited because it endured for less
than two decades.
14 Sweden enacted a constitution in 1809, but the executive retained absolute veto authority and parliament
only met once every five years.
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revenues suggests that, on average, they overestimated the amounts of available re-
sources.15 Pre-transformation regimes will thus appear to have greater extractive
capacity. State accounting practices improved over time, reducing the number and
magnitude of overestimates. These two features also bias the data against our hypothe-
ses about the relationships between political transformations, extractive capacity, and
economic performance.
2.2. Economic Performance
Our economic performance measure is the (logarithmic) annual growth rate of real
per capita GDP from Maddison (2010).16 These data are available for 1600, 1700,
and annually from 1820 to 1913. We linearly interpolate the pre-1820 data to provide
annual observations from 1650 onward for all years for which state capacity data are
also available.
Figure 1 displays the time-demeaned average per capita GDP growth rates around
political transformations. The top panel shows average per capita GDP growth rates
for fifty years before and after fiscal centralisation (left panel) and limited government
(right panel). Both political transformations were associated with economic improve-
ments. The average per capita GDP growth rate for fiscally centralised regimes was
around 0.90%, but only around 0.20% for fiscally fragmented regimes. Similarly, the av-
erage per capita GDP growth rate for limited government regimes (also around 0.90%)
was high relative to absolutist regimes (around 0.35%).
The bottom panel zooms in on average per capita GDP growth rates for ten years
before and after political transformations. We observe a sharp, sustained jump in per
capita GDP growth rates in the decade after fiscal centralisation.17 While there was
15 Bonney (1995, pp.423-506) and O’Brien (2011, pp.408-20) discuss the limitations of historical budgetary
data.
16 GDP data from Barro and Ursu´a (2010), a potential alternative, are not widely available before the
1850s. However, the post-1850 trends are similar to the Maddison data.
17 Structural break tests for real per capita GDP levels using Bai and Perron (2003)’s algorithm indicate
that the 95% confidence intervals for the structural breaks encompassed the dates of political transformations
for the majority of countries in the sample.
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a smaller jump associated with limited government, it was not sustained. The zoom
view also suggests that per capita GDP growth slowed in the years just before political
transformations, raising the possibility that regular recovery from economic downturns
rather than political change drove the growth improvements that we observe. Section
3 describes how we address this concern.
2.3. State Capacity
Our main state capacity measure uses per capita national government revenues to proxy
for the state’s extractive capacity. The revenue and population data are from Dincecco
(2011) and Dincecco et al. (2011). Our second measure uses per capita non-military
expenditures by national governments to proxy for the state’s productive capacity.
Data that are disaggregated beyond non-military expenditures (e.g., education) are
only available for a reduced number of sample countries. The Appendix describes the
sources and construction methods for the spending data.
The fiscal data form an unbalanced panel. We linearly interpolate, but never ex-
trapolate, any missing revenue data to provide annual observations from 1650 to 1913.
We also linearly interpolate population data between census years. The non-military
spending data are not widely available before 1816. We do not interpolate any miss-
ing expenditure observations, because the links between tax bases and government
spending were not always straightforward (e.g., during wartime).
Simple calculations show that the average annual growth rate of per capita revenues
for fiscally centralised regimes (1.76%) was more than twice as high as for fiscally
fragmented regimes (0.82%). Likewise, the average annual growth rate of per capita
revenues for limited government regimes was 1.60%, but only 1.14% for absolutist
regimes, a difference of 0.46 percentage points. The share of non-military expenditures
in total expenditures also increased by roughly 13 percentage points after both fiscal
centralisation and limited government.
Finally, we use cumulative railway networks in miles from Bogart (2008) as a non-
fiscal proxy for the state’s “infrastructural power.” Even if the state does not directly
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finance, build, or operate transport systems, it can play a key role as facilitator (see
Section 1). We thus favor the total railway network to the government-built part of the
network as the proper measure. However, the econometric results for the relationship
between fiscally centralised regimes and government-built railway networks were similar
to those reported. Data limitations prevented us from testing this relationship for
limited government regimes.
3. Econometric Methodology
To test the direct relationship between political transformations and economic perfor-
mance, we estimate the benchmark regression equation
∆yi,t = α0 + α1Ci,t + α2Li,t +X
′
i,t−1α3 + µi + λt + i,t. (1)
The dependent variable is the (logarithmic) annual growth rate of real per capita GDP
in country i between t−1 and t. The fixed effects µi account for time-invariant country
characteristics including geography, the nature and quality of initial political institu-
tions (Bockstette et al., 2002; Acemoglu et al., 2005), initial economic and technological
conditions (Comin et al., 2010), and cultural norms (Greif and Tabellini, 2010), while
the fixed effects λt account for common time shocks. X
′
i,t−1 includes an external con-
flict dummy for each year that a sample country participated in an European war, an
internal conflict dummy for each year of civil war, coup, or revolution, and a control
for annual population growth. Ci,t and Li,t are dummy variables that take the value
1 upon fiscal centralisation and limited government, respectively, in country i (and
take the value 0 beforehand). The coefficients α1 and α2 thus provide within-country
estimates of the relationships between the two political transformations and economic
performance.
Equation 1 addresses several common limitations of the cross-country growth litera-
ture (Durlauf et al., 2005). Country fixed effects account for time-invariant characteris-
tics and initial conditions that may influence economic and political development alike.
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Furthermore, by including lags of the dependent variable among the regressors in some
specifications, we not only account for autocorrelation and growth persistence, but can
also quantify the short- and long-run relationships between political transformations
and economic and fiscal outcomes.18
However, a set of methodological challenges still remains. A first concern is reverse
causation. Economic growth may promote political reforms and not vice versa (e.g.,
Glaeser et al., 2004; see Acemoglu et al., 2008, for a counterargument). Beyond classic
reverse causation, the growth estimates will be upwardly biased if political transforma-
tions took place during an economic upswing, because the coefficients α1 and α2 would
reflect this trend. Similarly, if political transformations took place during an economic
downturn, then the estimates may simply reflect the impacts of regular recovery that
would have taken place even without political change.
We address this concern in several ways. To test whether political transformations
took place during economic upswings or downturns, we allow for time-varying impacts
of political transformations (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Laporte and Windmeijer,
2005). We also perform placebo tests (Bertrand et al., 2004; Stasavage, 2013) that
recode political transformations as if they had taken place decades prior to the actual
dates. Finally, we implement the Granger-style causality test proposed by Angrist and
Pischke (2009, ch.5).
A second concern is omitted variable bias. While fixed effects control for constant
unobserved country-level heterogeneity, they do not account for the potential omission
of relevant time-varying explanatory variables that could be correlated with political
transformations. To address this possibility, we modify our benchmark model to include
country-specific time trends.19 Similarly, we allow for income level differences and
18 The bias induced by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in least square dummy variable (LSDV)
models decreases with the panel’s time dimension T (Nickell, 1981). Judson and Owen (1999) show that
the LSDV estimator outperforms alternative dynamic panel data models when T is 30; for our unbalanced
panel with annual observations, T ranges from 50 to 264, with an average value of 194. Furthermore, Judson
and Owen show that the bias for the coefficients of the other regressors, including the those of our variables
of interest, Ci,t and Li,t, is small. For robustness, we used lagged observations dated t − 2 and earlier to
instrument for ∆yi,t−1 following Bond et al. (2010), and implemented the bias-corrected LSDV estimator
proposed by Bruno (2005). The results were similar to those reported.
19 Country-specific time trends also help account for the non-stationarity of the political reform dummies,
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control for convergence dynamics by including lagged real per capita GDP in X′i,t−1
in some specifications.
There are other concerns related to the unique historical nature of our database.
Our benchmark model uses cluster-robust standard errors that accommodate het-
eroskedasticity and within-cluster correlation. However, the number of sample coun-
tries (i.e., 11) is small, which may bias downward the standard errors (Donald and
Lang, 2007; Cameron et al., 2008). For robustness, the regression tables also report
p-values for the two-sided Wald hypothesis tests computed according to Cameron et
al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure. This procedure is useful for small sample sizes
like ours because it does not rely on asymptotic approximations.20
Although we use a wide variety of techniques to address the various methodological
concerns, our within-country estimates do not necessarily capture the causal effects
of political transformations on economic and fiscal outcomes. The historical record
indicates that the causes and consequences of political transformations were the result
of complex interactions between a broad range of factors, some of which our econo-
metric framework invariably omits. While our estimates are not causal in nature, we
believe that our analysis highlights novel data patterns about the relationships between
political transformations, state capacity, and economic performance.
4. Political Transformations and Economic Performance
Table 3 displays the benchmark estimation results for the direct relationship between
political transformations and annual real per capita GDP growth.21 Column 1 reports
since once sample countries adopted centralised and limited regimes they typically did not revert.
20 To account for cross-sectional dependence beyond that captured by time fixed effects, we also computed
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors, which are robust to general forms of spatial and temporal dependence
regardless of the size of N . The results were similar to those reported.
21 We tested the time series properties of the main variables by performing common panel-data unit root
tests (e.g., Maddala and Wu, 1999; Levin et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003) with and without country-specific
trends. All tests failed to reject the hypothesis that the (log) level of per capita GDP contains unit roots for
every sample country. However, the null was always rejected when this variable was first-differenced. These
tests also suggest that the state capacity measures are stationary. Still, given the well-known reservations
about the power and reliability of these tests (Baltagi, 2005), we report results in Sections 4 and 5 for a broad
range of specifications that take into account both theoretical considerations and time series properties.
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the results for the static panel model with country fixed effects. There were significant
positive growth improvements after both fiscal centralisation and limited government.
Fiscally centralised regimes saw an average annual per capita GDP growth rate that was
0.66% higher than fiscally fragmented regimes, while limited government regimes saw
an average annual per capita GDP growth rate 0.32% higher than absolutist regimes.
Column 2 controls for common time shocks by introducing year fixed effects. The
coefficient for Ci,t falls to 0.22, but is still more than two standard deviations greater
than zero. The coefficient for Li,t is no longer significant. A potential explanation is
that, because the establishment of limited government typically took place just before
or during the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 1998), it may be difficult to disentangle
the two events. To account for unobserved time-varying country-level heterogeneity,
Column 3 introduces country-specific time trends to the Column 2 specification. There
is a small increase in the magnitude of the coefficient for fiscal centralisation, which
remains significant.
Columns 4 and 5 test potential interactions between the two political transforma-
tions. In this context, the individual coefficients for Ci,t and Li,t measure the economic
impacts of fiscal centralisation and limited government, respectively, when the trans-
formation in question was undertaken in the absence of the other, while the coefficient
for Ci,t × Li,t measures the non-additive impact of the two political transformations
combined. Column 4 shows that the coefficients for Ci,t and Ci,t × Li,t are positive,
but not significant. It is well-known that time fixed effects impose large costs in terms
of lost degrees of freedom for very long panels like ours (Wooldridge, 2003; Cameron
and Trivedi, 2010). To address this potential problem, Column 5 repeats the previous
specification after replacing the year fixed effects with a linear time trend to account for
common time shocks. Now the coefficient for fiscal centralisation is significant, with a
point estimate of 0.25. Furthermore, the coefficient for the interaction term is 0.31 and
is significant. This result suggests that the joint impact of political transformations
was notably greater than the sum of the individual impacts. Holding all else constant,
the average annual per capita GDP growth rate for a country in our sample where
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limited government followed fiscal centralisation was 1%, but only 0.63% if the second
political transformation was never undertaken.
Columns 6 and 7 repeat the specifications in Column 2 (country and year fixed
effects) and Column 3 (plus country-specific time trends) for the dynamic panel model
that introduces two lags of the dependent variable to account for growth persistence.22
The coefficient for fiscal centralisation remains significant, with an increase in the
annual per capita GDP growth rate of 0.29% to 0.34%. Furthermore, the dynamic
panel results indicate that fiscally centralised regimes not only saw a short-run increase
in growth, but also a significant increase in long-run per capita GDP growth rates of
0.22 to 0.25 percentage points per year.
Table 4 tests the robustness of the main results. Column 1 introduces the controls
for external and internal conflicts and population growth to the static panel model
with country and year fixed effects. Column 2 adds country-specific time trends to this
specification. The magnitude and significance of the coefficients for fiscal centralisation
are similar as before. None of the controls have systematic growth impacts.23
There is the possibility that our previous results conflate the direct economic im-
pacts of fiscal centralisation with the advent of modern industrial growth, which took
place throughout Europe from the 1850s onward (Mokyr, 1998). Column 3 thus re-
stricts the previous specification to the period before 1845. The magnitude of the
coefficient for Ci,t increases to 0.32 and remains significant.
The next three columns report results for the dynamic panel model. Column 4
repeats the Column 2 specification with country-specific time trends. The magnitude
and significance of the coefficient for fiscal centralisation resembles previous estimates.
22 As shown, both lags are statistically significant. A model with a single lag, the structure favored by
commonly-used information criteria (AIC, BIC), leads to nearly identical estimates for the political reform
indicators. We also tested longer lag structures of up to 8 lags to mimic other specifications present in the
long-run growth literature (e.g., Gemmell et al., 2011). The results for α1 and α2 were unchanged. Finally,
allowing for different lag lengths for each sample country did not significantly alter these results.
23 If we allow for contemporaneous correlations between the time-varying controls and ∆yi,t, then the
negative coefficients for external conflict and population growth become statistically significant. However,
the estimated relationship between fiscal centralisation and economic growth is unchanged. We report the
results that exclude contemporaneous correlations to address concerns about the possible endogeneity of the
controls (Jones, 1995; Gemmell et al., 2011).
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To control for conditional convergence, Column 5 includes the three-year lag of log
per capita GDP, ln yi,t−3. The coefficient for Ci,t remains positive, but is no longer
significant. Column 6 thus repeats the previous specification using a linear time trend
as justified previously. Now the coefficient for fiscal centralisation is highly significant,
with a point estimate of 0.43.
Columns 7 to 9 show the results that use averaged rather than annual data obser-
vations. Some scholars highlight the merits of using annual data in growth regressions
(Attanasio et al., 2000; Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008), while others argue that ob-
servations averaged over longer periods are more appropriate for growth determinants
that change slowly or infrequently (Durlauf et al., 2005). Taking data averages can
also filter out business cycle fluctuations and adjustments to occasional shocks (Islam,
1995; Beck et al., 2000), and help attenuate the effects of (transient) measurement
errors (Bond et al., 2010). Column 7 thus estimates the static model with country and
year fixed effects using five-year data averages.24 Columns 8 and 9 use 10- and 25-year
averages, respectively. The main results obtained using the annual data hold for the
averaged data. Fiscal centralisation saw significant growth improvements, while the
coefficients for limited government are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
To better assess the evolution of the relationships between political transformations
and economic performance, we relax the assumption that the impacts of fiscal central-
isation and limited government are constant over time and replace Ci,t and Li,t with
five “pulse” dummies each. The regression equation that we now estimate is
∆yi,t = α0 +
5∑
j=1
α1,jC˜
j
i,t +
5∑
j=1
α2,jL˜
j
i,t +X
′
i,t−1α3 + µi + λt + i,t, (2)
where the first four pulse dummies span non-overlapping five-year intervals before and
after each political transformation: C˜1i,t, L˜
1
i,t = 1 for years 6 to 10 before; C˜
2
i,t, L˜
2
i,t = 1
for years 1 to 5 before; C˜3i,t, L˜
3
i,t = 1 for years 0 to 4 after (including the transformation
24 Since the average number of observations for the five-year averaged dataset is 39, the LSDV estimator
is still preferable to alternative models (Judson and Owen, 1999). While the generalized method of moments
(GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) gives similar results to those reported, these results should be
interpreted with caution due to the well-known weaknesses of the GMM estimator for small N panels.
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year itself); and C˜4i,t, L˜
4
i,t = 1 for years 5 to 9 after. To measure the long-run relation-
ships between political transformations and economic performance, C˜5i,t and L˜
5
i,t take
the value 1 from the tenth year post-transformation onward, and 0 otherwise.25
Figure 2 displays the results of this exercise. Neither “pre-treatment” dummy is
significant, which suggests that there were no systematic economic differences between
the decade prior to political transformations and the benchmark period (i.e., more
than a decade prior). To put it differently, the positive relationship between fiscal
centralisation and economic performance that we find in Tables 3 and 4 does not appear
to be driven by regular recovery from any pre-transformation economic downturn, or
by anticipatory effects. Nor do we find evidence for any significant economic changes
in the first five years post-transformation. This result may highlight the importance of
“institutional consolidation” before any impacts of political transformations could be
realized. By contrast, the coefficient for C˜i,4 shows evidence for medium-run economic
improvements. The average annual real per capita GDP growth rate was 0.48% higher
5 to 9 years after fiscal centralisation. This coefficient is significant at the 10% level.
Similarly, fiscally centralised regimes saw highly significant economic improvements
from the tenth year post-transformation onward, with a long-run per capita GDP
growth gain of 0.24 percentage points per year. The size of this coefficient resembles
the long-run estimates from the dynamic specifications in Tables 3 and 4.26
Overall, the analysis in this section shows an important direct role for fiscal centrali-
sation in economic performance. The coefficient estimates for Ci,t are significant, large,
and robust: fiscally centralised regimes grew faster than fiscally fragmented regimes by
an average of 0.17% to 0.43% higher per year. Given that the average annual real per
25 For robustness, we tested shorter and longer pulse dummy lengths and different numbers of pulse
dummies overall. We also tested a variation of Equation 2 that replaced just one political reform indicator
with pulse dummies but held the other indicator constant. The results of these tests consistently indicated
a highly significant positive long-run impact of Ci,t on per capita GDP growth.
26 As another robustness check, we relaxed the assumption that the impact of political transformations was
the same for all cross-sectional units. In the spirit of Pesaran and Smith (1995)’s mean group-style estimator,
we estimated the dynamic models in Table 4 for each sample country and then averaged the coefficients. The
point estimate for the long-run relationship between fiscal centralisation and economic growth was roughly
0.30 and was significant. While we interpret this result with caution due to the small N , it provides further
support for our main conclusions.
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capita GDP growth rate among sample countries over the 1650-1913 period was 0.62%,
our estimates indicate that the growth improvements associated with fiscal centralisa-
tion were equivalent to about one-quarter to two-thirds of the actual per capita GDP
growth rate over this period, and 8% to 20% of its standard deviation. As noted in the
introduction, these magnitudes suggest that fiscal centralisation was roughly as im-
portant historically to economic development as democratisation is sometimes thought
to be today (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). Furthermore, the economic im-
provements associated with fiscal centralisation were long-lasting. Fiscally centralised
regimes saw a significant increase in long-run per capita GDP growth rates of 0.16 to
0.33 percentage points per year. While the coefficient estimates for limited government
are typically positive, the direct relationship between this political transformation and
economic performance is not significant. However, we do find some evidence of signifi-
cant interaction effects between the two political transformations, such that the joint
impact of fiscal centralisation and limited government combined was much greater than
the sum of each transformation when undertaken independently.
As described in Section 1, there are several potential mechanisms through which
political transformations could have improved economic performance. We now examine
one specific mechanism: greater state extractive and productive capacity.
5. Role of State Capacity
5.1. Political Transformations and State Capacity
To test for the relationship between political transformations and state capacity, we
use a modified version of Equation 1 which takes the dependent variable ∆Ei,t, the
(logarithmic) annual growth rate of state capacity in country i between t− 1 and t.
Table 5 displays the estimation results for growth in per capita revenues, our mea-
sure of the state’s extractive capacity. Column 1 shows the static panel model with
country and year fixed effects. There was a significant extractive capacity improvement
after fiscal centralisation. Fiscally centralised regimes saw an average annual growth
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rate of per capita revenues that was 1.41% higher than fiscally fragmented regimes.
The estimate for limited government is positive, but not significant.27 Column 2 in-
troduces the standard time-varying controls. The magnitude of the estimate for Ci,t
increases slightly and remains significant.
Column 3 introduces country-specific time trends. The coefficient for fiscal central-
isation increases further to 2.93 and remains significant. The estimate for Li,t becomes
significant (for p-values computed using cluster-robust standard errors) once we re-
place the year fixed effects with a linear time trend to reduce the cost of lost degrees
of freedom as in Column 4.
Column 5 restricts the Column 3 specification to the pre-1845 data to further control
for the potential fiscal impacts of the Industrial Revolution. The coefficient for Ci,t
roughly doubles in size to 6.61. The coefficient for Li,t is also large and significant.
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Columns 6 and 7 repeat the specifications in Columns 3 and 4 for the dynamic
panel model with two lags of the dependent variable. The estimates for both fiscal
centralisation and limited government are similar in magnitude and significance as
before. Furthermore, these estimates indicate that fiscally centralised regimes saw
a large increase in the long-run growth rate of per capita revenues of 2.89 to 3.02
percentage points per year.
To account for conditional convergence, Column 8 includes the three-year lag of log
per capita revenues, ln Ei,t−3, in the specification from Column 6. The coefficient for
Ci,t is again large and significant. The results also indicate that fiscal centralisation
was associated with a significant increase in (log) per capita revenue levels of 37% over
the long run.29
Table 6 displays the estimates for the model with country and year fixed effects,
27 However, if we use log per capita revenue levels as the dependent variable and re-run the Table 5
regressions, then the estimates for limited government are nearly always significant.
28 Unlike for economic growth, the Table 5 regressions do not show evidence of significant interaction
effects between the two political transformations.
29 We computed the long-run impact on per capita revenue levels as minus the ratio of the coefficients
for Ci,t and ln Ei,t−1, with standard errors obtained using the delta method (Papaioannou and Siourounis,
2008). Re-running the Column 6 regression with ln Ei,t as the dependent variable indicates that fiscal
centralisation saw a significant short-term annual increase in per capita revenue levels of 4%.
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time-varying controls, and country-specific time trends for our alternative state capac-
ity measures. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for growth in per capita non-military
expenditures, our measure of the state’s productive capacity. In line with the theoretical
implications as described in Section 1, the coefficient for limited government is always
positive and becomes significant (for p-values computed using cluster-robust standard
errors) once we control for conditional convergence in the dynamic panel model as in
Column 2.
For contrast, Column 3 shows the results for growth in per capita military expendi-
tures. Unlike the previous results, there is no evidence that limited government regimes
saw increases in the average annual growth rate of per capita military expenditures (the
coefficient for Li,t is negative). This comparison supports the case that the establish-
ment of limited government was associated with changes toward non-military spending.
The estimates for fiscal centralisation are never significant across these specifications.
Recall from Section 2 that expenditure data disaggregated beyond military expen-
ditures are not widely available. With this important caveat in mind, Columns 4
and 5 show the results for growth in per capita education expenditures for the static
and dynamic panel models, respectively. The estimates for Li,t are positive, large,
and significant. These results suggest that education was one non-military item upon
which limited government regimes spent funds. Again, the estimates for Ci,t are not
significant.
Columns 6 and 7 show the results for growth in cumulative railway networks, our
non-fiscal state capacity measure. The coefficients for Li,t, while positive, are not sig-
nificant for this measure. By contrast, the coefficient for Ci,t becomes significant (for
p-values computed using cluster-robust standard errors) once we account for condi-
tional convergence in the dynamic panel model as in Column 7. This result provides
some further evidence that fiscal centralisation enhanced the “infrastructural power”
of states.
In summary, Table 5 shows an important role for political transformations in greater
state capacity. The estimates indicate that fiscally centralised regimes and, to some
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extent, limited government regimes extracted per capita revenues at significantly higher
rates than fiscally fragmented regimes or absolutist regimes, respectively. Fiscally
centralised regimes saw an average annual growth rate of per capita revenues that was
1.41% to 4.27% higher than fiscally fragmented regimes. Given that the average annual
growth rate of per capita revenues over the 1650-1913 period was 1.36%, these estimates
are sizeable. Furthermore, the extractive capacity improvements associated with fiscal
centralisation were enduring. Fiscally centralised regimes saw an increase in long-run
growth rates of per capita revenues of 1.54 to 1.65 percentage points per year. While
Table 6 shows some evidence for a significant relationship between limited government
and productive capacity improvements, this evidence is less robust. Taken together,
these results suggest that political transformations had more important consequences
for extractive capacity than for productive capacity. To complete the analysis of the
state capacity mechanism, we now test for the relationship between state capacity and
economic performance.
5.2. State Capacity and Economic Performance
Following Bond et al. (2010), the benchmark regression equation that we estimate is
∆yi,t = β0 +
2∑
j=1
βj∆ Ei,t−j + β3ln Ei,t−3 +X′i,t−1β4 + µi + λt + i,t, (3)
where, as before, ∆yi,t is the (logarithmic) annual growth rate of real per capita GDP in
country i between t−1 and t, ∆Ei,t−j , j = 1, 2, are the first two lags of the (logarithmic)
annual growth rate of state capacity, and ln Ei,t−3 is the three-year lag of the state
capacity measure in log levels.30
Table 7 displays the estimation results. The first five columns test per capita
revenues, our measure of the state’s extractive capacity. Column 1 shows the results
30 We excluded contemporaneous correlations between ∆yi,t and the state capacity measures to address
endogeneity concerns (Jones, 1995; Gemmell et al., 2011). For robustness, we included either ∆Ei,t, ln Ei,t,
or both variables as regressors in Equation 3, using past values of the state capacity measures and historical
variables including state antiquity (Bockstette et al., 2002) and protection of capital (Acemoglu et al., 2005)
as instruments. The results were similar to those reported.
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for the static panel model with country and year fixed effects. Column 2 introduces the
standard time-varying controls. Column 3 adds country-specific time trends. There
is a significant relationship between extractive capacity improvements and subsequent
per capita GDP growth across all specifications: the coefficient of interest, ln Ei,t−3,
is always positive and significant, with values between 0.11 and 0.15. A comparison of
eighteenth-century England, which had undertaken both political transformations, and
France, which was still fiscally fragmented and absolutist, helps put these magnitudes
into perspective. English per capita revenues, which averaged 7.50 gold grams from
1700 to 1788, were more than double the French average over this period, at 3.71 gold
grams. Our estimates thus suggest that, ceteris paribus, this difference in extractive
capacity was associated with an annual per capita GDP growth rate for England that
was between 0.08 and 0.11 percentage points higher than for France. Given that the
actual average annual per capita GDP growth rate for France over the 1700-88 period
was 0.19, these magnitudes are large.
Column 4 repeats the Column 3 specification for the dynamic panel model with two
lags of the dependent variable. The coefficient for ln Ei,t−3 remains highly significant
and increases in magnitude to 0.18, implying a long-term impact on the per capita GDP
growth rate of 0.13 percentage points per year. Recall that fiscal centralisation was
associated with a significant long-run increase in per capita revenue (log) levels of 37%
(Column 8 of Table 5). A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation thus suggests that
the impact of fiscal centralisation on the long-run annual per capita GDP growth rate
that went through the revenue channel was about 0.05 percentage points, or roughly
15% to 30% of the total long-run per capita GDP growth improvements associated
with this political transformation.
To further assess the relative importance of this mechanism, Column 5 shows the
results for the Column 3 specification after introducing the dummy variables for fiscal
centralisation and limited government. The magnitude and significance of the coeffi-
cient for ln Ei,t−3 is similar as before. The coefficient for fiscal centralisation is also
significant, with a similar point estimate (0.26) as the equivalent Section 4 specification
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(i.e., Column 2 of Table 4). Taken in combination, these results suggest that, while
greater extractive capacity was one mechanism through which fiscal centralisation im-
proved long-run economic performance, non-fiscal mechanisms as noted in Section 1
(e.g., reductions in internal tariff barriers that increased investment mobility) were also
of great significance.
Column 6 shows the results for growth in per capita non-military expenditures. The
coefficient for ln Ei,t−3 is negative and not significant. We do not report the results for
the other alternative state capacity measures, which were also not significant.
Overall, Tables 5, 6, and 7 show evidence that greater state capacity was one
mechanism that linked political transformations with better economic performance.
There is a significant positive relationship between fiscal centralisation and, to some
extent, limited government and extractive capacity, and between greater extractive
capacity and economic growth. While we did not find evidence for a direct relationship
between limited government and economic performance in Section 4, these results
suggest that limited government played some indirect economic role through extractive
capacity improvements. These results also indicate that fiscal centralisation improved
economic performance through both fiscal and non-fiscal mechanisms. To conclude the
analysis, the next section uses placebo tests to further evaluate the robustness of the
main results.
6. Placebo Tests
The historical evidence described in Section 2 highlights the role of critical junctures in
political transformations (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012, ch.4). Similarly, the results
of the pulse dummy exercise show no evidence of anticipatory effects during the decade
prior to political transformations (Figure 2). For further robustness, we now perform
placebo tests (Bertrand et al., 2004; Stasavage, 2013) that address the possibility that
economic and fiscal differences across political regimes were the result of underlying
trends that preceded political transformations, rather than the transformations them-
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selves. We recode political transformations as if they had taken place decades prior to
the actual dates and then re-estimate the static and dynamic models with country and
year fixed effects and time-varying controls. If the coefficients for the placebo transfor-
mations are not significant, then this analysis will reinforce our previous results about
the economic and fiscal importance of political transformations.
Table 8 displays the estimation results for the placebo tests. Panel A reports the
results when the dependent variable is annual real per capita GDP growth. Column 1
shows the results for the political transformation placebos 25 years prior to the actual
dates, while Columns 2 to 4 increase the placebos to 50, 75, and 100 years prior,
respectively. The coefficients for the fiscal centralisation placebos are small, negative,
and not significant. For example, the 25-year placebo estimate in the static model is
0.007, versus 0.21 in the original specification (Table 4, Column 1).
Panel B repeats the placebo tests when the dependent variable is per capita revenue
growth. The placebo coefficients for fiscal centralisation or limited government are
typically not significant, and the magnitudes are routinely smaller than in the original
specifications. More than 80% of the placebo estimates are negative.
Panel C estimates the placebo models when the dependent variable is per capita
non-military expenditure growth. We report the results for 25-, 30-, 35-, and 40-
year placebos (we cannot compute the 50-year placebo due to the lack of non-military
expenditure data prior to 1816). Nearly all of the coefficients for the limited government
placebos are negative, and none are significant.
As an even further robustness check for reverse causation, we implement the pro-
cedure proposed by Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch.5). Our main result from Section 4
is that there is a significant relationship between fiscal centralisation and annual real
per capita GDP growth. If Ci,t impacts ∆yi,t but not the other way around, then the
coefficients for the leads Ci,t+τ , τ = 1, . . . , q, should not be statistically significant in a
regression of the sort
∆yi,t = α0 + α1,0Ci,t +
q∑
τ=1
α1,τCi,t+τ + α2Li,t +X
′
i,t−1α3 + µi + λt + i,t. (4)
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Figure 3 displays the results of this regression for two specifications: the first with q = 3
and no controls (left panel), and the second with q = 20, time-varying controls, and
country-specific trends (right panel). Only the coefficient for Ci,t remains significant
across specifications. The α1,τ s alternate between positive and negative coefficients,
with p-values ranging from 0.13 to 0.81. Using different specifications or q values, or
simultaneously including leads for Ci,t and Li,t, leads to broadly similar results.
Overall, the results of the placebo and Angrist-Pischke tests provide additional ev-
idence that reverse causation does not drive the relationships between political trans-
formations and the economic and fiscal outcomes that we find. They thus reinforce our
previous findings.
7. Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence about the long-run relationship between state capac-
ity and economic performance. We focus on Europe, the birthplace of modern economic
growth. National governments in European history were typically fiscally fragmented
and absolutist. We argue that both fiscal centralisation and limited government in-
creased the state’s capacity to extract greater tax revenues, and that greater state
capacity had positive economic implications through the creation of administrative
infrastructure and other channels.
To test this argument, we perform a panel data analysis on a novel database that
spans eleven countries and four centuries. Our analysis accounts for potential biases
including simultaneity, omitted variables, and unobserved heterogeneity. Placebo tests
allow us to further evaluate the validity of our argument. The results suggest that fiscal
centralisation rather than limited government was the most consequential political
change to occur in Europe from the Old Regime to World War I. We find a significant
direct relationship between fiscal centralisation and economic growth. Furthermore, we
find that greater state capacity was one mechanism through which fiscal centralisation
and, to some extent, limited government played significant economic roles. To the best
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of our knowledge, these results are among the first to show systematic evidence that
state capacity is a significant determinant of long-run economic growth.
Our analysis indicates that fiscal centralization operated through both fiscal and
non-fiscal mechanisms. One extension is to identify the main non-fiscal mechanisms.
We believe that our results take a first step that can guide future research in this
direction.
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Data Appendix
The database and do-file will be available upon publication from the website https:
//sites.google.com/site/mdincecco/.
Data for per capita tax revenues in gold grams from 1650 to 1913 are from Dincecco
(2011, appendices A.1, A.2, A.3). See Section 2 for further details.
Data sources for per capita military and education expenditures are listed ahead.
Disaggregated expenditure data in home currencies were converted into gold grams fol-
lowing the methodology in Dincecco (2011, appendix A.2). Data for total expenditures
and population are from Dincecco (2011, appendices A.1, A.2) unless otherwise stated.
Per capita non-military expenditures were computed as per capita total expenditures
minus per capita military expenditures.
Austria. Military spending data are from Pammer (2010). Education expenditure
data were not available.
Belgium. Military spending data are from Singer (1987). They were downloaded from
the Correlates of War website as the National Military Capabilities Dataset, Version
4.0. Education expenditure data were not available.
Denmark. Military spending data are from Singer (1987). They were downloaded from
the Correlates of War website as the National Military Capabilities Dataset, Version
4.0. Education expenditure data were not available.
England. Military and education spending data are from Mitchell (1988, public finance
table 4). To compute military expenditures, spending for the Army and Ordnance and
for the Navy were summed. Education expenditures uses the category for Education,
Art, and Science.
France. Military and and education spending data are from Fontvieille (1976, tables
CVXI-XXXV).
Netherlands. Military spending data are from van Zanden (1996, table 4) for 1816-
41. Van Zanden provides data averages for 1816-20, 1821-4, 1825-9, 1831-4, 1835-9,
and 1841-50. The average for 1816-20 was used for 1816, the average for 1821-4 for
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1821, and so on. The military spending shares closely match those from van Zanden
and van Riel (2010, table 2.1). Total expenditure data from this source were used
in combination with the information on shares to back out military expenditures. For
1816-30 we divided these figures by the expenditure share for the Southern Netherlands
(i.e., Belgium, Luxembourg, and their hinterlands) according to van Zanden (1996,
table 5) to derive military expenditures for the (Northern) Netherlands, as data for
total expenditures from Dincecco (2011) exclude the Southern Netherlands. The source
for the 1816-41 data does not provide education spending, which is included under the
expenditure category for Home Affairs. Military and education spending data are from
van Zanden and van Riel (2010, table 2.3) for 1850-1913. They provide data shares at
10-year intervals for 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1913. Total expenditure
data from this source were used in combination with the information on shares to back
out military expenditures.
Piedmont. Military spending data are from Dincecco et al. (2011) for 1830-59, the
Ufficio Storico (1980, pp. 508-9) for 1861-9 (Italy), and Hobson (1993) for 1870-1913
(Italy). Education expenditures are from Felloni (1959) for 1830-59 and Brosio and
Marchese (1986, table 4a) for 1861-1913 (Italy). Population data are from Dincecco et
al. (2011) for 1830-59.
Portugal. Military and education spending data are from Silveira (1987, table 8)
for 1816-27, Mata and Vale´rio (2001, table 1) for 1832-45, and Mata (1993, table
1) for 1851-1913. To compute military expenditures, spending by the Ministerio da
Guerra (after 1827; Exercito beforehand) and the Ministerio da Marihna were summed.
There was no education ministry over this period. Education expenditures thus uses
the category for the education burden (Encargos cum Instruc¸o˜es). Since the total
military spending calculation matches well with the Encargos cum Difesa category
(and perfectly from 1884 onward), we are confident that the same holds for education.
Dincecco (2011) does not provide total expenditures for Portugal for 1833; this data
point was taken from Mata and Vale´rio (2001, table 1).
Prussia. The German Reich (1871-1945) was a federal system and a great deal of taxing
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and spending was done at the state (e.g., Prussian) level. The federal government was
responsible for military expenditures and welfare (Ziblatt, 2006). Spoerer (2010, table
4.1) provides Prussian military and welfare expenditures for 1847 and 1867. After
unification there are only Reich data available for these categories. These data were
not used because there was no clear way of integrating the pre-1871 Prussian series with
the post-1870 Reich one. Spoerer’s data for Prussia were supplemented with 1820 data
for military defence from Ziblatt (2006, table 3.1). Here total Prussian expenditures
from 1821 were used due to data availability.
Spain. Military spending data are from Carreras and Tafunell (2006), table 12.8 for
1816-42 and table 12.13 for 1845-1913. To compute military expenditures, spending by
the Ministerio de Guerra (through 1842; the Ministerio de Defensa from 1845 onward)
and the Ministerio de Marina were summed. The sources for the 1816-99 data do
not provide education spending, which is included under the expenditure category
for the Ministerio de Estado through 1842 and the Ministerio de Fomento from 1845
onward. Education spending data for the Ministerio de Fomento are displayed for
1900-13 (Ministerio de Educacio´n y Ciencia).
Sweden. Military spending data are from Krantz and Scho¨n (2010, table XI). At the
central government level, there were no separate expenditure categories for infrastruc-
ture or education.
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Table 1
Dates of Fiscal centralisation
Year Event
England 1066 Establishment of uniform rule after Norman Conquest
France 1790 Major administrative reforms during French Revolution
Belgium 1795 Major administrative reforms after French annexation
Piedmont 1802 Major administrative reforms after French annexation
Netherlands 1806 Major administrative reforms under French control
Prussia 1806 Major administrative reforms after French defeat in battle
Spain 1845 Major administrative reforms after Moderate Coup of 1843
Austria 1848 Major administrative reforms during Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1859 Major administrative reforms after Revolutionary Era
Sweden 1861 Abolition of traditional tax system
Denmark 1903 Abolition of traditional tax system
Data source and notes. Dincecco (2011). See text for definition of fiscal centralisation.
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Table 2
Dates of Limited Government
Year Event
Netherlands 1572 Establishment of Dutch Republic (1572-1795) after revolt from Spain
1848 Implementation of new constitution during Year of Revolutions
England 1688 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Glorious Revolution
Belgium 1831 Founded as constitutional monarchy after Revolution of 1830
Piedmont 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Prussia 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Denmark 1848 Establishment of constitutional monarchy during Year of Revolutions
Portugal 1851 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after Revolutionary Era
Sweden 1866 Introduction of bicameral legislature
Austria 1867 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after defeat by Prussia
France 1870 Formation of constitutional regime during war with Prussia
Spain 1876 Establishment of constitutional monarchy after civil war
Data source and notes. Dincecco (2011). See text for definition of limited government.
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Table 3
Political Transformations and Economic Performance, 1650-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Fiscal centralisation 0.657 0.222 0.268 0.166 0.249 0.292 0.344
(0.087) (0.086) (0.125) (0.094) (0.099) (0.116) (0.171)
(0.000) (0.041) (0.033) (0.137) (0.030) (0.063) (0.063)
Limited government 0.321 0.053 -0.028 -0.102 -0.108 0.049 -0.080
(0.109) (0.165) (0.146) (0.230) (0.113) (0.225) (0.205)
(0.027) (0.757) (0.837) (0.728) (0.385) (0.836) (0.738)
Fiscal centralisation * Limited government 0.232 0.311
(0.239) (0.126)
(0.433) (0.010)
Lag (1) per capita GDP growth -0.185 -0.195
(0.094) (0.094)
Lag (2) per capita GDP growth -0.168 -0.178
(0.056) (0.053)
R-squared 0.049 0.202 0.207 0.202 0.055 0.244 0.254
Observations 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,772 1,750 1,750
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country fixed effects. Columns 2-4 and 6-7 include
year fixed effects and Column 5 includes a linear time trend. Additionally, Columns 3 and 7 include country-specific
time trends. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and
p-values for two-sided Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also
in parentheses (second line below coefficients for Fiscal centralisation, Limited government, and interaction term).
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Table 4
Political Transformations and Economic Performance, 1650-1913: Robustness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Fiscal centralisation 0.206 0.246 0.316 0.337 0.216 0.429 0.220 0.272 0.377
(0.096) (0.132) (0.101) (0.170) (0.170) (0.097) (0.073) (0.080) (0.130)
(0.064) (0.086) (0.015) (0.084) (0.238) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Limited government 0.080 -0.002 0.020 -0.068 0.045 0.138 -0.055 -0.043 -0.159
(0.175) (0.142) (0.035) (0.198) (0.231) (0.152) (0.191) (0.172) (0.374)
(0.644) (0.983) (0.467) (0.760) (0.845) (0.360) (0.758) (0.807) (0.673)
External conflict dummy (lagged) 0.264 0.271 0.072 0.189 0.160 -0.003 -0.066 -0.218 0.310
(0.279) (0.279) (0.054) (0.214) (0.226) (0.106) (0.084) (0.114) (0.450)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 0.030 0.101 -0.429 -0.038 -0.117 0.144 -0.252 -0.320 -0.534
(0.239) (0.250) (0.120) (0.249) (0.207) (0.169) (0.425) (0.186) (0.411)
Population growth (lagged) 0.008 0.009 -0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.029 -0.017
(0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.015) (0.028) (0.095)
Lag (1) per capita GDP growth -0.193 -0.185 -0.177
(0.093) (0.092) (0.096)
Lag (2) per capita GDP growth -0.177 -0.170 -0.139
(0.054) (0.058) (0.053)
Lag (3) log per capita GDP -0.612 0.223
(0.832) (0.420)
R-squared 0.205 0.211 0.208 0.256 0.247 0.096 0.425 0.626 0.720
Observations 1,757 1,757 1,027 1,746 1,746 1,746 350 173 65
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country fixed effects. All specifications include year fixed
effects except for Column 6, which includes a linear time trend. Additionally, Columns 2-4 include country-specific time
trends. Column 3 restricts the data to before 1845 and Columns 7-9 use 5-, 10-, and 25-year data averages, respectively.
Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values for two-sided
Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in parentheses (second line below
coefficients for Fiscal centralisation and Limited government).
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Table 5
Political Transformations and Extractive Capacity, 1650-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable is Per Capita Revenue Growth
Fiscal centralisation 1.405 1.467 2.929 3.254 6.610 3.770 3.923 4.268
(0.497) (0.531) (0.926) (0.738) (2.526) (1.251) (0.907) (1.081)
(0.001) (0.007) (0.039) (0.025) (0.108) (0.028) (0.006) (0.035)
Limited government 0.438 0.047 0.717 1.215 1.883 1.209 1.601 5.117
(0.564) (0.638) (0.652) (0.631) (0.758) (0.989) (0.807) (2.791)
(0.466) (0.973) (0.348) (0.120) (0.017) (0.254) (0.080) (0.236)
External conflict dummy (lagged) -0.774 -0.777 -1.257 0.620 0.957 -0.540 1.526
(1.237) (1.115) (0.508) (1.180) (1.887) (0.692) (1.796)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 2.697 3.008 1.854 4.190 2.106 1.262 0.499
(0.858) (0.962) (1.587) (1.518) (1.131) (1.823) (2.495)
Population growth (lagged) -0.191 -0.192 -0.064 -0.226 -0.274 -0.134 -0.256
(0.110) (0.110) (0.090) (0.056) (0.171) (0.149) (0.162)
Lag (1) per capita revenue growth -0.173 -0.169 -0.227
(0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
Lag (2) per capita revenue growth -0.132 -0.128 -0.201
(0.049) (0.044) (0.057)
Lag (3) log per capita revenues -11.401
(2.405)
R-squared 0.160 0.162 0.165 0.008 0.176 0.197 0.045 0.235
Observations 1,760 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,019 1,734 1,734 1,734
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country fixed effects. All specifications include
year fixed effects except for Columns 4 and 7, which include linear time trends. Additionally, Columns 3-8 include
country-specific time trends. The sample period is 1650-1845 for Column 5. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered
by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values for two-sided Wald tests computed according
to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in parentheses (second line below coefficients for Fiscal
centralisation and Limited government).
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Table 6
Alternative State Capacity Measures, 1816-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable is State Capacity Growth Measure
Non-Mil Non-Mil Mil Edu Edu RR RR
Exps Exps Exps Exps Exps Miles Miles
Fiscal centralisation -4.606 -0.429 0.046 -0.006 -0.117 1.224 2.718
(3.405) (3.715) (0.029) (0.068) (0.116) (1.393) (0.920)
(0.417) (0.927) (0.180) (0.877) (0.384) (0.357) (0.128)
Limited government 1.194 7.069 -0.066 0.081 0.138 2.480 4.927
(5.418) (2.933) (0.042) (0.016) (0.011) (4.512) (4.255)
(0.866) (0.139) (0.157) (0.000) (0.000) (0.556) (0.531)
External conflict dummy (lagged) -1.070 2.860 -0.149 -0.062 -0.007 -5.338 -0.604
(3.084) (3.748) (0.064) (0.030) (0.045) (3.746) (1.730)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 3.800 0.036 0.030 -0.040 -0.045 1.784 3.069
(1.893) (2.225) (0.075) (0.070) (0.070) (5.488) (4.778)
Population growth (lagged) 0.423 -0.050 -0.003 -0.011 0.006 -3.221 0.221
(0.264) (0.061) (0.003) (0.047) (0.058) (3.885) (1.081)
Lag (1) dependent variable log level -54.445
(33.094)
Lag (1) dependent variable -0.496 -0.370 -0.202
(0.054) (0.103) (0.060)
Lag (2) dependent variable -0.294 -0.061 -0.134
(0.044) (0.051) (0.033)
Lag (3) dependent variable log level -32.955 -28.164
(3.745) (5.003)
R-squared 0.186 0.348 0.200 0.463 0.515 0.495 0.517
Observations 724 694 728 330 320 435 413
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. All fiscal variables are in per capita terms. All specifications include country
and year fixed effects and country-specific time trends. The sample period is 1870-1913 for Columns 6 and 7.
Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values
for two-sided Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in
parentheses (second line below coefficients for Fiscal centralisation and Limited government).
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Table 7
State Capacity and Economic Performance, 1650-1913
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Lag (1) per capita revenue growth -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag (2) per capita revenue growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag (3) log per capita revenues 0.112 0.117 0.154 0.184 0.159
(0.031) (0.033) (0.064) (0.089) (0.073)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.023)
Lag (1) per capita non-mil exp growth -0.007
(0.005)
Lag (2) log per capita non-mil exp growth 0.000
(0.008)
Lag (3) log per capita non-mil exps -0.032
(0.380)
(0.880)
Fiscal centralisation 0.260
(0.130)
(0.059)
Limited government -0.043
(0.131)
(0.718)
External conflict dummy (lagged) 0.295 0.296 0.216 0.287 0.897
(0.300) (0.298) (0.247) (0.285) (0.880)
Internal conflict dummy (lagged) 0.037 0.124 0.000 0.111 0.853
(0.263) (0.285) (0.266) (0.267) (0.284)
Population growth (lagged) -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.025
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.024)
Lag (1) per capita GDP growth -0.193
(0.092)
Lag (2) per capita GDP growth -0.175
(0.054)
R-squared 0.204 0.205 0.211 0.255 0.211 0.206
Observations 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 1,736 699
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country and year fixed effects. Additionally,
Columns 3-6 include country-specific time trends. The sample period is 1816-1913 for Column 6. Robust
standard errors clustered by country in parentheses (first line below coefficients) and p-values for two-
sided Wald tests computed according to Cameron et al. (2008)’s wild bootstrap-t procedure also in
parentheses (second line below coefficients for Lag (3) Log per capita revenues, Fiscal centralisation,
Limited government, and Lag (3) Log per capita non-military expenditures).
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Table 8
Placebo Tests
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Real Per Capita GDP Growth
25 yrs prior 50 yrs prior 75 yrs prior 100 yrs prior
Static Model
Fiscal centralisation (placebo) 0.007 -0.158 -0.079 -0.037
(0.132) (0.106) (0.074) (0.092)
Limited government (placebo) -0.048 -0.037 -0.035 -0.045
(0.173) (0.107) (0.086) (0.075)
Observations 1,757 1,757 1,757 1,757
Dynamic Model
Fiscal centralisation (placebo) 0.012 -0.188 -0.099 -0.047
(0.163) (0.135) (0.096) (0.127)
Limited government (placebo) -0.018 -0.056 -0.043 -0.071
(0.237) (0.126) (0.103) (0.090)
Observations 1,746 1,746 1,746 1,746
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Revenue Growth
25 yrs prior 50 yrs prior 75 yrs prior 100 yrs prior
Static Model
Fiscal centralisation (placebo) -0.232 -0.727 -0.340 -1.868
(0.879) (0.950) (0.812) (0.938)
Limited government (placebo) 0.164 -0.536 -1.034 -0.598
(0.619) (0.937) (1.489) (1.357)
Observations 1,748 1,748 1,748 1,748
Dynamic Model
Fiscal centralisation (placebo) 0.070 -1.025 -0.569 -2.207
(0.720) (1.172) (1.096) (1.367)
Limited government (placebo) 0.671 -0.689 -0.917 -0.471
(1.138) (1.177) (1.819) (2.011)
Observations 1,734 1,734 1,734 1,734
Panel C: Dependent Variable is Per Capita Non-Military Expenditure Growth
25 yrs prior 30 yrs prior 35 yrs prior 40 yrs prior
Static Model
Fiscal centralisation (placebo) 1.018 0.684 3.709 8.720
(2.086) (2.502) (5.273) (12.342)
Limited government (placebo) -2.378 -4.855 -5.861 -3.916
(4.203) (6.402) (8.632) (10.660)
Observations 724 724 724 724
Dynamic Model
Fiscal centralisation (placebo) -2.025 -1.696 -3.142 -5.846
(2.871) (2.892) (5.214) (21.222)
Limited government (placebo) -0.922 -4.036 -4.369 2.116
(3.376) (5.904) (7.541) (6.964)
Observations 694 694 694 694
Notes. Estimation method is OLS. All specifications include country and year fixed effects
and time-varying controls. The sample period is 1650-1913 for Panels A and B and 1816-1913
for Panel C. Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
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Fig. 1. Time-Demeaned Average Real Per Capita GDP Growth Around Political Transformations
Notes. Top panel shows 50 years before and after and bottom panel shows 10 years before and after. Left
panel shows fiscal centralisation and right panel shows limited government. Circles represent average per
capita GDP growth rates across sample countries. Solid lines represent locally-weighted regression curves
fitted to data. Dashed horizontal lines represent pre-transformation and post-transformation average per
capita GDP growth rates.
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Fig. 2. Time-Varying Relationship Between Political Transformations and Real Per Capita GDP Growth
Notes. Left panel shows fiscal centralisation and right panel shows limited government. Dots correspond to
point estimates for coefficients of pulse dummies and solid lines represent 90% confidence intervals (Equation
2). C˜1i,t, L˜
1
i,t = 1 for years 6 to 10 before political transformations; C˜
2
i,t, L˜
2
i,t = 1 for years 1 to 5 before;
C˜3i,t, L˜
3
i,t = 1 for years 0 to 4 after (including transformation year itself); C˜
4
i,t, L˜
4
i,t = 1 for years 5 to 9 after;
and C˜5i,t, L˜
5
i,t = 1 from 10th year post-transformation onward.
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Fig. 3. Conditional Correlations Between Real Per Capita GDP Growth and “Future” Political Transforma-
tions
Notes. Dots represent point estimates for α1,0, the coefficient for Ci,t in Equation 4. Circles are point
estimates for α1,τ , τ = 1, . . . , q. Solid lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
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